| Annotation: |
Introduction: the article analyzes the Condorcet paradoxes and considers the ways of their possible solution. Purpose: to identify the fairest electoral system for elections in single- and multi-member electoral districts. Methods: general scientific (dialectic, analysis, synthesis, abstracting, specification) along with specific scientific (formal-legal, comparative law, technical-legal) research methods were used. Results: most of current electoral systems do not meet the Condorcet criterion. The absolute majority and plurality electoral systems based on categorical voting can in some cases lead to unreasonable voting results. Most preferential systems do not meet this criterion either. There are several techniques able to resolve the first Condorcet paradox positively, among which the Shulze, Tideman, Copeland, and Kemeny-Young methods are worth mentioning. Some scientists find Marcus Shulze’s algorithm beneficial compared to the
others. Many countries use this method for intraparty voting and also e-voting on the Internet (e. g., curators of the Wikipedia and some other projects are elected in this way). This approach, however, is unable to resolve the Condorcet paradoxes entirely; moreover, it gives rise to some other ones. Unfortunately, nowadays in Russia preferential systems cannot be applied due to some peculiarities of the electorate’s mentality, procedures for vote counting and determination of the election results. Conclusions: the Condorcet paradoxes do not appear in the countries with true two-party or pseudo-two-party systems. At presidential elections such states successfully practice the two-round majoritarian system with the absolute majority. On the contrary, in true multi-party states the use of preferential systems (the Shulze method, etc.) is rather advantageous.
|
| References: |
1. Belov S. A. Sistemnoe pravovoe regulirovanie izbiratel'noy sistemy [System Legal Regulation of Electoral System]. Rossiyskiy yuridicheskiy zhurnal – Russian Juridical Journal. 2011.
Issue 1. Pp. 88–100. (In Russ.).
2. Berlyavskiy L. G. Sravnitel'noe izbiratel'noe pravo [Comparative Suffrage]. Moscow, 2013. 240 p. (In Russ.).
3. Vol'skiy V. I. Protsedury golosovaniya v ma-lykh gruppakh s drevneyshikh vremen do nachala XX veka [Voting Procedures in Small Groups from Earliest Times until the Early 20th Century]. Moscow, 2014. 76 p. (In Russ.).
4. Vol'skiy V. I., Karpov A. V. Primenenie raz-lichnykh variantov pravila peredachi golosov [Application of Different Versions of Single Transferable Vote System]. Politiya – Politeia. 2011. Issue 2. Pp. 162–174. (In Russ.).
5. Demina N. Metod markiza Kondorse, ili svetlyy put' spaseniya demokratii [The Marquis de Condorcet Method, or the Bright Way of the Rescue of Democracy]. Available at: http://www.polit.ru/article/2010/05/21/maskin_condorset. (In Russ.).
6. Zarubezhnoe izbiratel'noe pravo: ucheb. posobie / pod red. V. V. Maklakova [Foreign Suffrage: Textbook; ed. by V. V. Maklakov]. Moscow, 2003. 288 p. (In Russ.).
7. Ivanchenko A. A., Kynev A. V., Lyubarev A. E. Proportsional'naya izbiratel'naya sistema v Rossii: Istoriya, sovremennoe sostoyanie, perspektivy [Proportional Electoral System in Russia: History, Current State, Prospects]. Moscow, 2005. 333 p. (In Russ.).
8. Konstitutsionnoe (gosudarstvennoe) pravo zarubezhnykh stran: Chast' obschaya / pod red. B. A. Strashuna [Constitutional (State) Law of Foreign Countries: General Part; ed. by B. A. Strashun]. Moscow, 2000. Vols. 1–2. 784 p. (In Russ.).
9. Sravnitel'noe konstitutsionnoe pravo: ucheb. posobie / pod red. V. E. Chirkina [Comparative Constitutional Law: Textbook; ed. by V. E. Chirkin]. Moscow, 2002. 448 p. (In Russ.).
10. Khudoley K. M. Nuzhen li konstitucionny (ustavnyн) sud v sub"ekte RF? [Do Federal Subjects of Russia Need Constitutional (Statutory) Courts?]. Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Yuridicheskie Nauki – Perm University Herald. Juridical Sciences. 2016. Issue 4(34). Pp. 391–401. (In Russ.). DOI: 10.17072/1995-4190-2016-34-391-401.
11. Arrow K. J. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1951. 124 p. (In Eng.).
12. Bartoldi J., Tovey C., Trick M. Voting Schemes for which it Can be Difficult to Tell Who Won the Election. Social Choice and Welfare. 2006. Vol. 2. Pp. 157–165. (In Eng.). DOI: 10.1007/
BF00303169.
13. LeGrand R. Descriptions of ranked-ballot voting methods. Available at: http://www.cs.
wustl.edu/~legrand/rbvote/desc.htlm. (In Eng.).
14. McLean I. E. J. Nanson, Social Choice and Electoral Reform. Australian Journal of Political Science. 1996. Vol. 31. Issue 3. Pp. 369–385. (In Eng.). DOI: 10.1080/10361149651102.
15. Reilly B. Social Choice in the South Seas: Electoral Innovation and the Borda Count in the Pacific Islands Countries. Political Science Review. 2002. Vol. 23. Issue 4. Pp. 355–372. (In Eng.). DOI: 10.1177/0192512102023004002.
16. Reynolds A., Reilly B., Ellis A. Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm, 2008. 237 p. (In Eng.).
17. Shulze M. A New Monotonic, Clone-Indepen¬dent, Reversal Symmetric, and Condorcet-Consistent Single-Winner Election Method. Social Choice and Welfare. 2011. Vol. 26. Pp. 267–303. (In Eng.).
18. Smith W. Descriptions of voting systems. Available at: http://www.m-shulze.9mail.de/
votedesc.pdf. (In Eng.).
19. Tideman N. Collective Decisions and Voting: The Potential for Public Choice. Burlington, 2006. 337 p. (In Eng.).
20. Young H. P. Optimal Voting Rules. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1995. Vol. 1. Pp. 51–64. (In Eng.).
|
