Perm University Herald. Juridical Sciences. 2021. Issue 3 (53)

Title: A PROPOSAL ON REFORMATION OF THE ELECTION SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Authors:

D. M. Khudoley, Perm State University

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ORCID: 0000-0001-5870-1537 
ResearcherID: E-3184-2016 
Articles of «Scopus» & «Web of Science»:       DOI: 10.17072/1995-4190-2015-2-18-28
DOI:10.17072/1995-4190-2016-33-258-267

K. M. Khudoley, Perm State University

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ORCID: 0000-0003-1805-0674 
ResearcherID: E-3186-2016 
Articles of «Scopus» & «Web of Science»:       DOI: 10.17072/1995-4190-2015-2-29-40
DOI: 10.17072/1995-4190-2016-34-391-401
Requisites: Khudoley D. M., Khudoley K. M. Predlozhenie po reformirovaniyu izbiratel'noy sistemy Rossiyskoy Federatsii [A Proposal on the Reformation of the Electoral System of the Russian Federation]. Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Juridicheskie nauki – Perm University Herald. Juridical Sciences. 2021. Issue 53. Pp. 562–601. (In Russ.). DOI: 10.17072/1995-4190-2021-53-562-601
DOI: 10.17072/1995-4190-2021-53-562-601
Annotation:

 

Introduction: the article analyzes the extent to which electoral systems meet different (mathematical and judicial) evaluation criteria. Purpose: to identify the fairest algorithm for mandate distribution when electing deputies and officials. Methods: apart from general scientific methods, we extensively used special scientific methods including comparative legal and systematic ones. Results: we have defined the range of mathematical criteria (the absolute majority rule, the Condorcet paradox, the principle of proportional representation of the parties, etc.) and legal criteria (the provisions of the principles of equal, free, and fair election). Preferential voting systems have been found to meet mathematical and judicial criteria most of all. A number of preferential voting systems meet the Condorcet paradox and ensure proportional representation of the parties.  During such an election, free and equal participation of independent and party candidates is ensured. Many other systems of majoritarian, proportional, and mixed types do not meet the abovementioned criteria. Unfortunately, in particular cases the Condorcet paradox does not allow determining the candidate to be elected. Consequently, we suggest combining the algorithms developed by Tideman, Kemeny, Young, and Schulze in order to find the ‘strongest path’, or the most reliable way of determining the candidates’ positions in the election. Conclusions: the preferential voting system developed by us is universal and can be used while electing both officers (the president, the governor) and deputies.  If it was implemented, electoral legislation would be standardized, as well as the operation of election committees. Such a unification would allow improving the level of citizens' electoral rights protection.

Keywords: electoral law; principles of electoral law; electoral system; majoritarian electoral systems; proportional electoral systems; mixed electoral systems; semi-proportional electoral systems
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Received: 30.11.2020
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ISSN 1995-4190 ISSN (eng.) 2618-8104
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DOI 10.17072/1995-4190
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